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UTAH SUPREME COURT
HOLDS THAT PROMOTIONAL
MATERIALS MAY
CONSTITUTE AN EXPRESS
WARRANTY
In State of Utah by the Division of Consumer
Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that promotional materials provided by a manufacturer to a
retailer, which were then provided to a consumer, could be construed as the basis for an
express warranty. The court also held that such a
warranty may exist despite the absence of privity
between the manufacturer and the consumer
and the absence of apparent authority between
the manufacturer and retailer.
Background
In June 1974, Dr. Dewey MacKay contracted
with Pendleton Builders ("Pendleton") to install
a new roof on his home. Pendleton showed Dr.
MacKay a sample of a Slate Blend Timberline
asphalt shingle made by GAF Corporation
("GAF"). Pendleton also showed Dr. MacKay
materials promoting the shingle, including pictures of a house newly roofed with the shingles.
According to his deposition, Dr. MacKay was
also informed by either Pendleton or its subcontractor that the shingle was GAF's top-of-theline, self-sealing shingle. Dr. Mackay was further
informed that the shingle was made of the highest quality asphalt and that it carried a twentyfive-year guarantee. Upon these representations, Dr. MacKay purchased Timberline shingles
and had them installed on his roof.
In 1981, the shingles started to curl due to
improper sealing. Dr. MacKay contacted GAF,
who sent its representative to Dr. MacKay's
home to conduct tests on the shingles. The tests
demonstrated that the shingles were defective
at the time they had been installed. Thereafter,
GAF informed Dr. MacKay that GAF's liability
was limited by GAF's written "Asphalt Shingle
Warranty." Dr. MacKay did not possess a copy of
the warranty.
After learning of GAF's limited liability, Dr.
MacKay complained to the State of Utah Division of Consumer Protection ("the Division").
The Division thereafter filed a suit against GAF

alleging that GAF had violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("the Act"), Utah Code
Ann. §§ 13-11-1 to 13-11-23 (1987). The trial court
granted GAF's motion for summary judgment
because it reasoned that the Division was not
authorized to sue on behalf of a consumer based
on the consumer's complaint filed with the Division. Additionally, the court held that Pendleton
did not possess the requisite authority to make
express warranties about GAF's products and
that GAF's liability was limited by its written warranty. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment order
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Utah Supreme Court: Division of Consumer
Protection Need Not Sue First
The court first considered whether the Division could sue for damages to a consumer
based on the consumer's complaint filed with
the Division. GAF argued that the Division's
enforcing authority under § 13-11-17 of the Act,
which was amended in 1983, allows the Division
to recover damages only for those consumers
who file complaints with the Division after the
Division has already instituted a lawsuit. The
court disagreed, stating that such a construction
of the statute would defeat the objective of providing a remedy to consumers who have purchased defective products and who cannot or
choose not to file a law suit for economic
reasons.
The court noted that, prior to the 1983 amendment, the Act authorized the Division to collect
damages only on behalf of consumers who
complained to the Division before the Division
filed suit. The court held that the 1983 amendment was intended to allow consumers to join a
pending action within a reasonable time after
the Division filed suit, thereby eliminating the
need for the Division to file a new lawsuit for
subsequent consumer complaints about the
same product or service.
Deceptive Practices Include Untrue
Representations
The court then considered whether the Division had stated a valid claim for which relief
could be granted. The Division's first claim for
relief was based on § 13-11-4(2)(b) of the Act.
Under that provision, deceptive practices or acts
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include untrue representations made by a supplier about a product's standard, quality, grade,
style, or model. The Division alleged that GAF
had represented the Timberline shingles to be
top-of-the-line shingles but that they were in
fact defective. The court held that the Division's
allegation, if proven, would be a violation of the
Act. The court further held that the applicable
version of § 13-11-4(2)(b), prior to being
amended in 1985, did not require intent to
deceive on the part of the supplier.Accordingly,
despite the fact that GAF was unaware of the
defective condition of the shingles, the Division
had stated a valid claim for relief under the Act.
The Division's second claim for relief was
based on § 13-11-4(2)(j), which defines deceptive practices and acts to include false representations of warranties. The Division argued that
GAF, through its promotional materials or its
agent, Pendleton, made deceptive representations about the shingles' express warranty. Although the court stated that generally speaking
this claim was a valid claim for relief under the
Act, the court held that, here, Pendleton did not
have apparent authority to make representations regarding GAF's products. An agent's statements may be imputed to a principal when the
principal knows of or agrees with the statements. In such cases the agent would be held to
have apparent authority for the principal. However, here the court held that merely providing
Pendleton with promotional materials was not
enough to establish Pendleton's apparent authority for GAF. Therefore, to the extent the

Division's claims against GAF were based on
statements made by Pendleton they failed to
state a claim for relief under the Act.
Promotional Representations Construed as an
Express Warranty
The court reasoned that GAF's promotional
materials provided a valid basis for the Division's
breach of warranty claim. An express warranty
may exist if it is reasonable to conclude that a
person entered into a transaction based on a
seller's statement of fact, promise or description
of the products. Although actual reliance on the
statement need not be shown, the statement
should form a part of the basis of the bargain.
The court held that the representations about
the quality of the shingles contained in GAF's
promotional materials could constitute express
warranties under the Act.
Finally, the court held that privity of contract is
not required to demonstrate a breach of an
express warranty. The court stated that manufacturers create a large part of the demand for their
products through representations in promotional materials. Therefore, it is not unjust to
hold manufacturers accountable under an express warranty, despite a lack of privity. The
court held Dr. MacKay's testimony established a
prime facie case that the promotional materials
provided express warranties and thus summary
judgment was inappropriate. The court reversed
the trial court's order of summary judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
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